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Abstract
Axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems reveals three major principles: (i) proportionality
(PRO), (ii) equal awards (EA), and (iii) equal losses (EL). However, most real life bankruptcy
procedures implement only the proportionality principle. We construct a noncooperative in-
vestment game to explore whether the explanation lies in the alternative implications of these
principles on investment behavior. Our results are as follows (i) EL always induces higher total
investment than PRO which in turn induces higher total investment than EA; (ii) PRO always
induces higher egalitarian social welfare than both EA and EL in interior equilibria; (iii) PRO
induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EL in interior equilibria but its relation to EA
depends on the parameter values (however, a numerical analysis shows that on a large part of
the parameter space, PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EA).
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1 Introduction
Following the seminal work of ONeill (1982), a vast literature focused on the axiomatic analysis
of bankruptcy problems. As the name suggests, a canonical example to this problem is the case
of a bankrupt rm whose monetary worth is to be allocated among its creditors. Each creditor
holds a claim on the rm and the rms liquidation value is less than the total of the creditors
claims. The axiomatic literature provided a large variety of bankruptcy rulesas solutions to this
problem. The most central of these rules are all based on one (or more) of three central principles:
(i) proportionality, (ii) equal awards, and (iii) equal losses.1
Bankruptcy has also been a central topic in corporate nance where researchers analyze a
large number of issues related to it (e.g. see Hotchkiss et al (2008)).2 This literature shows
that, in practice almost every country uses the following rule to allocate the liquidation value of a
bankrupt rm.3 First, creditors are sorted into di¤erent priority groups (such as secured creditors
or unsecured creditors). These groups are served sequentially. That is, a creditor is not awarded a
share until creditors in higher priority groups are fully reimbursed. Second, in each priority group,
the shares of the creditors are determined in proportion to their claims.4
In this paper, we explore why in actual bankruptcy laws, proportionality has been preferred
over the other two principles. Our starting observation is that alternative bankruptcy rules a¤ect
the investment behavior in a country in di¤erent ways. In a way, each rule induces a di¤erent
noncooperative game among the investors. Comparing the equilibria of these games, in terms of
1As their names suggest, these principles suggest that the agentsshares should be chosen, respectively, (i) pro-
portional to their investments, (ii) so as to equate their awarded shares, (iii) so as to equate their losses from initial
investment. There are bankruptcy rules purely based on one of these principles (such as the Proportional, Con-
strained Equal Awards, Constrained Egalitarian, Constrained Equal Losses rules) as well as rules that apply di¤erent
principles on di¤erent types of problems (such as the Talmud rule which uses both equal awards and equal losses
principles).
2This is not surprising considering that in US between 1999 and 2009, more than 551000 rms
led for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and more than 22.16 billion USD were allocated in these cases (see
http://www.justice.gov/ust/index.htm).
3Procedures on the liquidation of the rm and its allocation among creditors exist in bankruptcy laws of every
country. For examples, see Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or the Receivership code in U.K. In some countries
such as Sweden or Finland, these procedures provide the only option for the resolution of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
laws of some other countries, such as U.S., also o¤er procedures (such as Chapter 11) for reorganization of the
bankrupt rm.
4This is a very old and common practice, referred to as a pari passu distribution; the term meaning proportionally,
at an equal pace, without preference(see Blacks Law Dictionary, 2004).
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total investment or social welfare, might provide us ways of comparing alternative bankruptcy rules
and thus, the principles underlying them, in a way that is not previously considered in either the
axiomatic literature or the corporate nance literature on bankruptcy, both discussed at the end
of this section.
As a representation of the proportionality principle, we use the Proportional rule (hereafter,
PRO), which assigns each investor a share proportional to his investment. We then look at a class
of rules that mix the proportionality principle with equal awards (hereafter, AP[]). These rules
pick an -weighted average of the proportional allocation and the (pure) equal division. For  = 0;
the rule AP [] coincides with an unconstrained equal awards rule (EA) which always chooses
equal division. For  = 1; it coincides with PRO. Thirdly, we look at a class of rules that mix
the proportionality principle with equal losses (hereafter, LP[]). These rules pick an -weighted
average of the proportional allocation and an allocation which equates the losses incurred by the
investors. For  = 0; the rule LP [] coincides with an unconstrained equal losses rule (EL)
which always equates the investorslosses. For  = 1; it coincides with PRO.
For each one of these bankruptcy rules, we construct a simple game among n investors who
simultaneously choose how much money to invest in a rm. The total of these investments determine
the value of the rm. The rm is a lottery which either brings a positive return or goes bankrupt.
In the latter case, its liquidation value is allocated among the investors according to the prespecied
bankruptcy rule. For each bankruptcy rule, we analyze the Nash equilibria of the corresponding
investment game. We then compare these equilibria.
In our model, agents have Constant Absolute Risk Aversion preferences and are weakly ordered
according to their degrees of risk aversion. (This ordering is without loss of generality since the
agents are identical in other dimensions.) The agents do not face liquidity constraints and thus,
their income levels are not relevant. However, as is standard in the literature, it is possible to
interpret the agentsrisk aversion levels as a decreasing function of their income levels. (Thus, less
risk averse agents can be thought of as richer, bigger investors.) Alternatively, each agent can be
taken to represent an investment fund. In this case, the income level is irrelevant. The risk-aversion
parameter attached to each investment fund then represents the type of that fund.
Since we do not restrict possible congurations of risk aversion, our model can be used to
represent and compare societies with very di¤erent risk aversion (or income) distributions, ranging
from symmetric to asymmetric distributions with di¤erent moments. This exibility also allows us
to compare the three principles in terms of how they treat di¤erent types of agents (such as big
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versus small investors) as well as how they react to changes in the risk-aversion distribution.
Our analysis compares bankruptcy rules in terms of two criteria that were not considered
before. Our rst criterion is total equilibrium investment which is a simple measure of how
a bankruptcy rule a¤ects investment behavior in the economy. It is reasonable to think that a
government prefers bankruptcy rules that induce higher total investment in the economy. Thus,
a bankruptcy rule that induces higher total investment than PRO might be considered a superior
alternative to it. On the other hand, it is not clear that an increase in total investment will also
increase the welfare of the investors. Thus, our second criterion is equilibrium social welfare.
Egalitarianism and utilitarianism present two competing and central notions of measuring social
welfare. We therefore compare bankruptcy rules in terms of both egalitarian and utilitarian
social welfare that they induce in equilibrium.
A summary of our main results is as follows. The investment game has a unique Nash equilibrium
for every parameter combination and for each bankruptcy rule. These equilibria are such that, at
all parameters values (i) EL induces higher total investment than PRO which in turn induces
higher total investment than EA; (ii) PRO induces higher egalitarian social welfare than both
EA and EL in interior equilibria; (iii) PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EL in
interior equilibria but its relation to EA depends on the parameter values (however, a numerical
analysis shows that on a large part of the parameter space, PRO induces higher utilitarian social
welfare than EA). Thus, in the connes of our simple model, PRO outperforms EA in almost every
criterion. Also, switching from PRO to EL increases total investment but decreases both egalitarian
and utilitarian social welfare.
PRO is advantageous to the other rules also in the sense that only under PRO do the in-
vestors have dominant strategies (which are strictly dominant). Thus, for planning purposes, the
government has a stronger prediction on investor behavior under PRO:
Finally, potential heterogeneity of the agents risk attitudes plays an important role in our
analysis. Bankruptcy rules are very di¤erent in terms of the incentives that they provide for big
versus small investors. The equal losses principle o¤ers relatively better protection to the bigger
(i.e. less risk averse) investors. The equal awards principle does the opposite. The proportionality
principle strikes a compromise by o¤ering the same proportion of their investment to every agent.
We also observe that under di¤erent rules an agent reacts very di¤erently to changes in the others
risk attitudes: under EA (EL) his investment decreases (increases) as the other agents get more
risk averse; under PRO; however, his investment remains constant. This once again makes the
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equilibrium prediction under PRO more reliable since under PRO; the agents, in determining
their investment strategies, need not be informed about the risk-aversion (or income) prole of the
other investors. A detailed summary of our ndings as well as their possible policy implications is
presented in Section 6.
In the axiomatic literature, the most common applications of the equal awards and the equal
losses principles are the Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) (which equates the agentsawards
subject to the constraint that no agent should receive a share higher than his initial investment) and
the Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL) (which equates the agentslosses subject to the constraint
that no agent should receive a negative share).5 Instead of using these rules, in the paper we use
their unconstrained versions but later restrict the parameter space so that the aforementioned
constraints will not be binding in equilibrium. As will be discussed later, we prefer this approach
since the unconstrained rules induce games that are much better behaved than their constrained
counterparts (which lead to existence and multiplicity problems). Additionally, we show in Appendix
B that any equilibrium under the constrained CEA and CEL rules is also an equilibrium under
their unconstrained versions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3, we calculate
and analyze the Nash equilibrium induced by each rule. In Section 4, we compare bankruptcy rules
in terms of the total investment they induce in equilibrium. In Section 5, we then compare them in
terms of social welfare. We summarize our ndings and conclude in Section 6. Appendix A contains
the proofs. Appendix B is on CEA and CEL rules. Finally, Appendix C contains numerical welfare
comparisons.
Related Literature.
The axiomatic literature on bankruptcy and taxation problems contains many studies that
analyze the properties of alternative bankruptcy rules. For example, Dagan (1996), Schummer
and Thomson (1997), Herrero and Villar (2002), and Yeh (2001) analyze properties of CEA. Yeh
(2001a), Herrero and Villar (2002), and Herrero (2003) analyze properties of CEL. Aumann
and Maschler (1985) and the following literature discuss properties of a Talmudic rule. ONeill
(1982), Moulin (1985a,b), Young (1988), Chun (1988a), de Frutos (1999), Ching and Kakkar (2000),
Chambers and Thomson (2002), and Ju, Miyagawa, and Sakai (2007) analyze properties of PRO.
Thomson (2003 and 2008) presents a detailed review of the extensive axiomatic literature.
5Additional to CEA, the axiomatic literature contains several rules that are based on the principle of equal awards,
such as the Pinilesrule, and the Constrained Egalitarian rule.
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The corporate nance literature also contains a large number of papers that study bankruptcy
(e.g. see Bebchuck (1988), Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992), Atiyas (1995), Hart (1999), Stiglitz
(2001)). However, most of these papers study reorganization procedures such as Chapter 11 in the
US. There are some papers that discuss liquidation procedures (and some, such as Baird (1986)
argue that they are superior to reorganization procedures). For example, Bris, Welch, and Zhu
(2006) use a comprehensive data set from the US to compare liquidation and reorganization proce-
dures in terms of costs and e¢ ciency. Stromberg (2000) uses Swedish data to evaluate liquidation
procedures. Also, Hotchkiss et al (2008) summarize bankruptcy laws in di¤erent countries and as
part of it, describe liquidation procedures (as these constitute the only resolution to bankruptcy
in some countries). Finally, there are studies that discuss the implications of priority classes on
investor behavior. However, all of these studies take the existing proportional allocation rule (i.e.
PRO) as a given, nonchanging constant and does not discuss its merits in relation to alternative
rules.
There are previous papers that employ game theoretical tools to analyze bankruptcy problems.
Aumann and Maschler (1985), Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs, (1987), and Dagan and Volij (1993) relate
bankruptcy rules to cooperative game theoretical solutions. Chun (1989) presents a noncooperative
game that implements an egalitarian surplus sharing rule. Dagan, Serrano, and Volij (1997) present
a noncooperative game that implements a large family of consistent bankruptcy rules by employing
the rules two-person version in the design. Chang and Hu (2008) carry out a similar analysis
for a class of f-just rules. Herrero (2003) implements the CEA and CEL bankruptcy rules.
Garcia-Jurado, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Villar (2006) present noncooperative games for a large class
of acceptablerules. Finally, Eraslan and Y¬lmaz (2007) and the literature cited therein analyze
negotiation games that arise during reorganization of the bankrupt rm. None of these paper
however focus on investment implications of these bankruptcy rules.
This paper is closely related to Karagözo¼glu (2010) who also designs a noncooperative game
and analyzes investment implications of a class of rules that include PRO, CEA, and CEL. Aside
from the fact that Karagözo¼glu considers the constrained rules CEA and CEL; the main di¤erences
are as follows. In Karagözo¼glu (2010) model, (i) there are two types of agents (high income and
low income) who (ii) choose either zero or full investment of their income, and (iii) the agents
are risk neutral. Due to these di¤erences, our results are quite di¤erent. In Karagözo¼glu (2010),
PRO maximizes total investment whereas in our setting, the maximizer of total investment is the
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EL (as seen in Section 4).6 On the other hand, both studies nd PRO to induce higher total
investment than EA and CEA; respectively. Also, Karagözo¼glu (2010) does not carry out a welfare
analysis but additionally analyzes a class of rules that includes the Talmud rule (the TAL family
by Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006) and discusses the case of two rms.
2 Model
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the set of agents. Each i 2 N has the following Constant Absolute Risk
Aversion (CARA) utility function ui : R+ ! R on money: ui(x) =  e aix: Assume that each
i 2 N is risk averse, that is, ai > 0: Also assume that a1  :::  an:
Each agent i invests si 2 R+ units of wealth on a risky company. The company has value
P
N si
after investments. With success probability p 2 (0; 1), this value brings a return r 2 (0; 1] and
becomes (1 + r)
P
N si. With the remaining probability (1   p), the company goes bankrupt and
its value becomes 
P
N si where  2 (0; 1) is the fraction that survives bankruptcy.
In case of bankruptcy, the value of the rm is allocated among the agents according to a prespec-
ied bankruptcy rule. Formally, a bankruptcy problem is a vector of claims (i.e. investments)
s = (s1; :::; sn) 2 Rn+ and an endowment E 2 R+ satisfying
P
N si  E. In our model, the bankrupt
rm retains  fraction of its capital.7 Thus E = 
P
N si is a function of s: As a result, the vector
s (together with ) is su¢ cient to fully describe the bankruptcy problem at hand. Thus in our
setting, the class of all bankruptcy problems is simply Rn+:
A bankruptcy rule F assigns each s 2 Rn+ to an allocation x 2 Rn satisfying
P
N xi =

P
N si. In this paper, we will focus on the following bankruptcy rules. The Proportional Rule
(PRO) is dened as follows: for each i 2 N , PROi(s) = si. The Equal Awards rule (EA)
is dened as EAi(s) =

n
P
N si. The Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is dened as
CEAi(s) = minfsi; g where  2 R+ satises
P
N minfsi; g = 
P
N si. The Equal Losses rule
(EL) is dened as ELi(s) = si   1 n
P
N sj : The Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL) is
6 In our opinion, this di¤erence is due to two reasons. First, Karagözo¼glu uses binary strategies and this limits
the sensitivity of equilibrium total investment to the problems parameters. Thus, when in binary strategies the two
rules induce equal investment, it might be that EL exceeds PRO when we take into account how much the agents do
invest. The second reason is the di¤erence between EL and CEL:We show in Appendix B that CEL induces more
types of equilibria than EL and in some of them, PRO induces more total investment than CEL:
7This assumption is supported by empirical evidence from Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) who note that the rm
scale is fairly unrelated to percent value changes in bankruptcy.
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dened as CELi(s) = maxfsi   ; 0g where  2 R+ satises
P
N maxfsi   ; 0g = 
P
N si.
We will also be interested in the following families of rules. For each  2 [0; 1]; the EA-PRO
mixture rule with weight  is
AP []i (s) = PROi (s) + (1  )EAi (s)
=
1 + (n  1)
n
si + (1  ) 
n
X
Nni
sj :
For  = 1; this rule becomes equal to PRO and for  = 0; it becomes equal to EA. Similarly, for
each  2 [0; 1]; the EL-PRO mixture rule with weight  is
LP []i (s) = PROi (s) + (1  )ELi (s)
=
n + (n  1 + ) (1  )
n
si   (1  ) (1  )
n
X
Nni
sj :
For  = 1; this rule becomes equal to PRO and for  = 0; it becomes equal to EL.
For each bankruptcy rule F , we analyze the following investment game it induces over the
agents. Each i 2 N has the strategy set Si = R+ from which he chooses an investment level si:
Let S =
Y
N
Si: A strategy prole s 2 S corresponds for agent i to the lottery that brings the net
return (1 + r)si   si = rsi with probability p and the net return Fi(s)   si with the remaining
probability (1  p). Note that Fi(s)  si  0: The interpretation is that the agent initially borrows
si at an interest rate normalized to 0: If the investment is successful, he receives (1 + r) si, pays
back si; and is left with his prot rsi: In case of bankruptcy, he only receives back Fi(s) and has to
pay back si; so his net prot becomes Fi(s) si: The same lottery is obtained from an environment
where each agent i allocates his monetary endowment between a riskless asset (whose return is
normalized to 0) and the risky company. In this second interpretation, assume that the agent does
not have a liquidity constraint. That is, he is allowed to invest more than his endowment. This
assumption only serves to rid us from (the rather unrealistic) boundary cases where some agents
spend all their monetary endowment on the risky rm. Alternatively, one can impose a liquidity
constraint but focus on equilibria which are in the interior of the strategy spaces.
Agent is expected payo¤ from strategy prole s 2 S is thus
UFi (s) = pui(rsi) + (1  p)ui(Fi(s)  si). (1)
=  pe airsi   (1  p)e aiFi(si;s i)+aisi
Let UF =
 
UF1 ; :::; U
F
n

: The investment game induced by the bankruptcy rule F is then
dened as GF = hS;UF i: Let (GF ) denote the set of Nash equilibria of GF .
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3 Equilibria Under Alternative Bankruptcy Rules
We start by analyzing the Nash equilibria and dominant strategy equilibria of each game. This
section serves as a preliminary for our comparisons of total investment (in Section 4) and welfare
(in Section 5).
Proportional Rule (PRO):
The following proposition shows that under PRO; the investment game has a unique dominant
strategy equilibrium and no other Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1 If ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

 0; the investment game under the rule PRO has a unique
dominant strategy equilibrium (0; :::; 0) : Otherwise, the game has a unique dominant strategy equi-
librium s in which each agent i chooses a positive investment level si given by
si =
1
ai (r + 1  ) ln

pr
(1  p)(1  )

:
There is no other Nash equilibria.
It is useful to note that the strategies in Proposition 1 are strictly dominant.
Note that if pr > (1  p)(1  ); all agents choose a positive investment level at the dominant
strategy equilibrium. This condition simply compares the return on unit investment in case of
success, r, weighted by the probability of success, p, with the loss incurred on unit investment in
case of failure, (1  ) ; weighted by the probability of failure, (1  p). Investing in the rm is
optimal if the returns in case of success outweigh the losses incurred in case of failure.
Equilibrium investment levels are ordered as s1  :::  sn: Also si is increasing in the probability
of success p and the fraction of the rm that survives bankruptcy  and it is decreasing in the agents
degree of risk aversion ai: It does not have a xed relation to the rate of return in case of success,
r.
Mixtures of Proportionality and Equal Awards (AP []):
The following proposition determines the form of the unique Nash equilibrium under AP []. We
would like to exclude parameter values for which at the Nash equilibrium an agents compensation
in case of bankruptcy is more than his investment. Thus, we also identify the parameter values
under which AP []i (s)  si for each i 2 N:
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Proposition 2 If ln

npr
(1 p)(n  (n 1))

 0; the investment game under the rule AP [] has a
unique Nash equilibrium (0; :::; 0) : Otherwise, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium s in which
each agent i chooses a positive investment level si given by
si =
n (1 + r   ) +  (1  ) +  (1  ) ai
P
Nni
1
aj
ain (1 + r   ) (1 + r   ) ln

npr
(1  p) (n     (n  1))

:
In the latter case, the unique Nash equilibrium s satises AP []i (s)  si for each i 2 N if and
only if
1
anP
N
1
aj
 r (1  )
n (1  ) (1 + r   ) : (2)
Note that if pr > (1   p)(1   1+(n 1)n ); all agents choose a positive investment level at the
Nash equilibrium. This condition simply compares the return on unit investment in case of success,
r, weighted by the probability of success, p, with the loss incurred on unit investment in case of
failure, (1   1+(n 1)n ); weighted by the probability of failure, (1  p).8 Investing in the rm is
optimal if the returns in case of success outweigh the losses incurred in case of failure.
Equilibrium investment levels are ordered as s1  :::  sn: Also si is increasing in the probability
of success p and the fraction of the rm that survives bankruptcy  and it is decreasing in the agents
degree of risk aversion ai. It does not have a xed relation to the rate of return in case of success,
r.
For  = 0; AP [] becomes the Equal Awards rule, EA: This is the unconstrained version of
a well-known rule from the axiomatic literature, called the Constrained Equal Awards rule, CEA;
dened in Section 2: In Appendix B, we rst show that, under CEA; a Nash equilibrium does not
exist for every parameter combination. We then show in Proposition 9 that if a Nash equilibrium
exists under CEA, it is unique and more importantly, it is identical to the unique equilibrium under
EA: Thus, Proposition 9 implies that analyzing the Nash equilibrium under EA also tells us about
CEA.
Mixtures of Proportionality and Equal Losses (LP []):
The following proposition shows that the Nash equilibrium under LP [] is of the form s1 
:::  sn where agents up to some k 2 N choose positive investment and the rest chooses zero
investment. For  < 1; that is, for LP [] 6= PRO; there are parameter values under which, at the
8The term (1  1+(n 1)
n
) is equal to  (1  ) + (1  )  1  
n

. The  weighted part of this expression is the
loss incurred in case of PRO and the (1  ) weighted part is the loss incurred in case of EA.
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Nash equilibrium, LP [] proposes a negative share for some agents. We would like to exclude such
parameter values. That, is we restrict ourselves to cases where LP []i (s)  0 for each i 2 N:
Such equilibria are also identied in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 If ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

 0; the investment game under LP [] has a unique
Nash equilibrium (0; :::; 0) : Otherwise, there is k 2 N such that the unique Nash equilibrium is
s = (s1; :::; sk; 0; :::; 0) where for each i 2 f1; :::; kg ; si > 0 and is given by
si =
0@ 1
ai
  (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) k + n ( (1  ) + r)
kX
j=1
1
aj
1A ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

r +  (1  ) :
In the latter case, the unique Nash equilibrium s satises LP []i (s)  0 for each i 2 N if and
only if
1
anP
N
1
aj
 (r + 1) (1  ) (1  )
n (1   + r) (1  + ) : (3)
Under Inequality 3, k = n: That is, s = (s1; :::; sn) > 0:
Under Inequality 3, if pr > (1 )n (1  p) (1 + (n  1)) ; all agents choose a positive investment
level at the Nash equilibrium. This condition simply compares the return on unit investment in case
of success, r, weighted by the probability of success, p, with the loss incurred on unit investment in
case of failure, (1 )n (1 + (n  1)) ; weighted by the probability of failure, (1  p).9 Investing in
the rm is optimal if the returns in case of success outweigh the losses incurred in case of failure.
Equilibrium investment levels are ordered as s1  :::  sn: Also si is increasing in the probability
of success p and the fraction of the rm that survives bankruptcy  and it is decreasing in the agents
degree of risk aversion ai: It does not have a xed relation to the rate of return in case of success,
r.
For  = 0; LP [] becomes the Equal Losses rule, EL: This is the unconstrained version of a
well-known rule from the axiomatic literature, called the Constrained Equal Losses rule, CEL: In
Appendix B, we rst show that, under CEL; a Nash equilibrium does not exist for every parameter
combination. We then show in Proposition 10 that if a Nash equilibrium exists under CEL, for
two agents, it can be one of four types two of which are identical to the equilibria under EL: Thus,
Proposition 10 implies that analyzing the Nash equilibrium under EL also tells us about CEL.
9The term (1 )
n
(1 + (n  1)) is equal to  (1  ) + (1  )   1 
n

. The  weighted part of this expression is
the loss incurred in case of PRO and the (1  ) weighted part is the loss incurred in case of EL.
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Figure 1: Agent 1s equilibrium investment s1 as a function of the other agents risk aversion a2
under EA (red), PRO (green), and EL (black) where r = 0:3; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
a2
s2
Figure 2: Agent 2s equilibrium investment s2 as a function of his risk aversion a2 under EA (red),
PRO (green), and EL (black) where r = 0:3; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 1.
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4 Comparisons of Equilibrium Investment
In this section, we compare bankruptcy rules in terms of total investment that they induce in
equilibrium. Let us rst check individual investment levels in a numerical example for two investors
where r = 0:3; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 1 and for which gures 1 and 2 respectively demonstrate
s1 and s2 as a function of a2 for the three extreme rules: PRO; EA; and EL:
As can be seen in Figure 1, in terms of s1; the three rules are ordered as EL > PRO > EA:
Also, s1 is independent of a2 under PRO but it is increasing (decreasing) in a2 under EL (EA).
This demonstrates a general phenomenon. The bigger investor, that is, the relatively less risk averse
agent 1, faces very di¤erent incentives under the three rules. In case of bankruptcy, he is protected
best by EL and worst by EA whereas his share under PRO is independent of the other agents.
This reects on his investment choices.
Figure 2 looks at the smaller investor, the more risk averse agent 2 and shows that under all
three rules, his equilibrium choice s2 is decreasing in a2: Also, the three rules do not have a xed
order in terms of s2: For low risk aversion levels (i.e. when agent 2 is not too di¤erent than agent
1), the ordering of the three rules in terms of s2 is EL > PRO > EA, same as s1: But it is reversed
for high risk aversion levels. For this case, agent 2 is protected best under EA and worst under
EL and this reects to his equilibrium investment choices under them. It is also interesting to
note that, for risk aversion levels in between the two extremes, it is PRO that induces the highest
investment level s2 on agent 2.
Looking at individual investment levels, one does not observe a clear ordering of the three rules.
However, in terms of total investment, we obtain a strong result. The following two theorems
establish that, in terms of total investment, the rules analyzed in the previous section are ordered
as
EL > LP [] > PRO > AP [] > EA:
Theorem 1 Equilibrium total investment under the EA-PRO mixture rule, AP [], is weakly in-
creasing in the weight of PRO, , and it is strictly increasing whenever AP [] induces positive
investment in equilibrium. Thus, in the class fAP [] j  2 [0; 1]g ; PRO maximizes total invest-
ment and EA minimizes total investment.
Theorem 2 Equilibrium total investment under the EL-PRO mixture rule, LP [], is weakly de-
creasing in the weight of PRO, , and it is strictly decreasing whenever LP [] induces positive
13
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Figure 3: Individual welfare levels under PRO (green), EA (red), and EL (black). The solid line
represents the rst agent and the dashed line represents the second agent. The parameter values
are p = 0:8; r = 0:6;  = 0:7; a1 = 3:
investment in equilibrium. Thus, in the class fLP [] j  2 [0; 1]g ; PRO minimizes total invest-
ment and EL maximizes total investment.
It is interesting to note that, even when all agents are identical in terms of risk aversion, the
ordering of the rules in terms of total investment is as above. Particularly, EL still induces more
total investment than the other rules. This means that these rules not only di¤er in terms of
how they treat big versus small investors (as discussed at the beginning of this section), but they
also di¤er in terms of the investment incentives that they provide in a symmetric game where all
agents are identical in terms of risk aversion. This can be observed in gures 1 and 2 by choosing
a2 = a1 = 1.
5 Comparisons of Equilibrium Welfare
In this section, we look at the individual and social welfare levels induced by the Nash equilibria
under the PRO, EA, and EL rules. We compare these three rules in terms of both egalitarian and
utilitarian social welfare.
For analytical tractability, we focus on the two-agent case and the three main rules. We also
assume that inequalities (2) and (3) hold, that is, in equilibrium EA does not award an agent a
share greater than his investment level and EL does not award an agent a negative share.
In Figure 3, we x p = 0:8; r = 0:6;  = 0:7; a1 = 3 and demonstrate individual welfare
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levels as a function of a2: As noted above, an agents welfare under PRO is independent of a2:
Thus, it remains constant at  0:6 for both agents. The individual welfare under both EA and EL
depends on a2: At the symmetric case (when a1 = a2 = 3) agents 1 and 2 receive identical welfare
levels. They receive the highest common payo¤ under PRO, then under EL, then under EA.10
An increase in a2, under both EA and EL; has opposite e¤ects on the two agents. Under EA;
the more risk averse agent 2 always receives a higher payo¤ than the less risk averse agent 1 and
his welfare increases in a2. Exactly the opposite holds for EL: the less risk averse agent 1 always
receives a higher payo¤ than agent 2 and his payo¤ increases in a2. This observation is summarized
in the following lemma. Note that, under EA and EL; the two agents receive the same payo¤ if
and only if the game is symmetric (a1 = a2) or the equilibrium investments are both zero.
Lemma 4 Assume a1  a2. Then,
(i) UPRO1 (
 
GPRO

) = UPRO2 (
 
GPRO

);
(ii) UEA1
 

 
GEA
  UEA2    GEA ; equality achieved i¤ a1 = a2 or ln pr(1 p)(1 
2
)

 0,
(iii) UEL1
 

 
GEL
  UEL2    GEL ; equality achieved i¤ a1 = a2 or ln 2pr(1 p)(1 )  0.
5.1 Egalitarian Social Welfare Levels
The egalitarian social welfare level induced by a rule F is the minimum utility an agent
obtains at the Nash equilibrium of the investment game induced by F :
EGF (p; r; ; a1; a2) = min

UF1 (
 
GF

); UF2 (
 
GF

)
	
:
We next compare the Egalitarian social welfare levels induced by PRO; EA; and EL for inte-
rior equilibria (where both agents choose positive investment levels). Other cases mostly employ
numerical comparisons and are presented in detail in Appendix C.
Lemmas 6 and 7 in Appendix A respectively show that the egalitarian social welfare under both
EA and EL is maximized when a1 = a2:We use them to show that PRO induces higher egalitarian
social welfare than both EA and EL.
10 If a1 = a2; PRO always induces higher payo¤ than the other two rules. The ordering between EA and EL,
however, depends on the parameter values. It is easy to construct another numerical example where EA induces
higher payo¤ than EL in the symmetric case.
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Theorem 3 For parameter values where all three rules induce an interior equilibrium (where all
agents choose a positive investment level), that is, when ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

> 0, PRO induces strictly
greater egalitarian social welfare than both EA and EL.
Note that if a1 = a2; for each one of our three rules, UF1 (
 
GF

) = UF2 (
 
GF

) = EGF (p; r; ; a) :
Thus, we have the following corollary to Theorem 3.
Corollary 5 If a1 = a2; the Nash equilibrium payo¤ prole induced by PRO, that is, 
UPRO1 (
 
GPRO

); UPRO2 (
 
GPRO

)

, Pareto dominates the Nash equilibrium payo¤ proles in-
duced by EA and EL,
 
UEA1 (
 
GEA

); UEA2 (
 
GEA

)

and
 
UEL1 (
 
GEL

); UEL2 (
 
GEL

)

:
We thus conclude that PRO always induces a higher egalitarian social welfare than the other
two rules. The relationship between EL and EA changes with the parameters but a numerical
analysis shows that the number of parameter values for which EA induces higher welfare than EL
is almost three times as much as the parameter values for which EL induces higher social welfare
than EA. The details of this comparison as well as other cases are presented in Appendix C.
5.2 Utilitarian Social Welfare Levels
The utilitarian social welfare level induced by a rule F is the total utility the two agents
obtain at the Nash equilibrium of the investment game induced by F :
UTF (p; r; ; a1; a2) = U
F
1 (
 
GF

) + UF2 (
 
GF

):
We next compare the Utilitarian social welfare levels induced by PRO; EA; and EL for inte-
rior equilibria (where both agents choose positive investment levels). Other cases mostly employ
numerical comparisons and are presented in detail in Appendix C.
Lemma 8 in Appendix A shows that the utilitarian social welfare under EL is maximized when
a1 = a2. We next use it to show that PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EL.
Theorem 4 For parameter values where both PRO and EL induce an interior equilibrium (where
all agents choose a positive investment level), that is, when ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0; PRO induces
strictly greater utilitarian social welfare than EL.
We know by Corollary 5 that in every symmetric game (that is, where a1 = a2), PRO induces
higher utilitarian social welfare than EA:
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For a1 < a2; we run a numerical analysis and show that the number of parameter values for
which PRO induces higher welfare than EA is almost one and a half times as much as the parameter
values for which EA induces higher social welfare than PRO. The numerical comparison of EA and
EL reveals that EA outperforms EL almost twice as much as EL outperforms EA. The details of
this comparison as well as other cases are presented in Appendix C.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis compares the proportionality, equal awards, and equal losses principles in terms of
two criteria (total investment and social welfare induced in equilibrium) that were not considered
before. Our ndings are as follows:
(i) In terms of total investment, there is a constant ranking of these rules which is independent of
the parameter values considered:
Total Investment: EL > LP [] > PRO > AP [] > EA:
For a mixture of EL and PRO, LP [], equilibrium total investment is decreasing in ; the weight
of PRO. Also, for a mixture of EA and PRO, AP [], equilibrium total investment is increasing
in ; the weight of PRO. We also get a similar ordering for CEA, PRO, and CEL.11
(ii) Independent of the parameter values considered, PRO always induces a higher egalitarian social
welfare than both EA and EL in an interior equilibrium.:
Egalitarian social welfare: PRO > fEA;ELg :
The ranking between EA and EL depends on the parameter values. However, a numerical analysis
shows that EA exceeds EL three times as much as EL exceeds EA.
(iii) Independent of the parameter values considered, PRO always induces a higher utilitarian
social welfare than EL in an interior equilibrium.:
Utilitarian social welfare: PRO > EL:
Also, a numerical analysis shows that size of the parameter space where PRO induces higher
utilitarian social welfare than EA is one and a half times as much as the size of the part where EA
exceeds PRO. We also numerically compared EA and EL and observed that EA exceeds EL two
times as much as EL exceeds EA.
11One exception is a rather unrealistic equilibrium under CEL.
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(iv) In symmetric games (where a1 = a2), we obtain a very strong welfare comparison: PRO Pareto
dominates both EA and EL.
(v) There always is a unique dominant strategy equilibrium under PRO (where agents play strictly
dominant strategies). No other rule induces dominant strategies. However, under both AP [] and
LP [], a unique Nash equilibrium always exists.
Overall, the almost universal principle of proportionality does not maximize total investment in
the economy. By switching from proportionality to equal losses, it is possible to increase total in-
vestment. However, this switch causes a welfare loss in the society, both according to the egalitarian
and utilitarian social welfare functions. A switch from proportionality to the equal awards principle
always decreases total investment. It is also interesting to note that it also lowers egalitarian social
welfare.
Finally, comparing equilibria at di¤erent risk-aversion proles shows us that the three principles
are very di¤erent in terms of the incentives that they provide for big versus small investors. The
equal losses principle o¤ers relatively better protection to the bigger (i.e. less risk averse) investors.
The equal awards principle does the opposite. The proportionality principle strikes a compromise
by o¤ering the same proportion of their investment to every agent.
Note that our social welfare measures only consider the investors in the game. They do not
take into account the welfare implications of investment in the rest of the economy (such as welfare
e¤ects of investment on consumers or future generations). This is an interesting question which is,
unfortunately, out of the scope of our current model.
For tractability of the model, we use CARA utility functions. While the CARA family is widely
used in economic modeling as well as nance, it is an open question whether our ndings are
replicated with other families of utility functions.
In our model, the agents simultaneously move to choose their investment levels. This is to
model interactions where there are no structural order di¤erences between the investors. It might
be more appropriate to model other types of real life interactions by using a sequential version of
our model. One complication is that with n agents of possibly heterogenous risk aversion levels,
there are too many possible orders of moves. Some, however, might be more natural than the
others.
In our model, the rate of return r and the probability of success p are independent of the
agentsinvestment levels. It might be interesting to look at extensions of the model where these
parameters, in some way, depend on the investment levels.
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7 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof. (Proposition 1) PRO, as a function of the investment levels, is dened as PROi(s) = si:
Then, by Equation 1, agent is utility under PRO can be written as
UPROi (s) =  pe airsi   (1  p)eaisi(1 ):
Note that the payo¤ function of agent i is independent of the other agentsinvestment levels. The
unconstrained maximizer of this expression is
i (s i) =
1
ai (r + 1  ) ln

pr
(1  p)(1  )

:
The best response function of agent i can then be written as bi(s i) = max f0; i (s i)g : Note that
this expression is independent of s i: So it in fact denes a strictly dominant strategy for each agent
i.
Proof. (Proposition 2) By Equation 1, agent is utility under AP [] becomes
U
AP []
i (si; sj) =  pe airsi   (1  p)e
 ai
 
1+(n 1)
n
si+(1 ) n
P
Nni
sj
!
+aisi
=  pe airsi   (1  p)e
aisi

n  (n 1)
n

 ai(1 ) n
P
Nni
sj
The unconstrained maximizer of this expression is
i (s i) =
n ln

npr
(1 p)(n  (n 1))

ai (n (1 + r)     (n  1)) +
(1  )
(n (1 + r)     (n  1))
X
Nni
sj :
Thus, agent is best response is bi (s i) = max f0; i (s i)g : Since (1 )(n(1+r)  (n 1)) < 1; there is
a unique solution to the system fi (s i) = si j i 2 Ng. Solving it gives,
si =
n (1 + r   ) +  (1  ) +  (1  ) ai
P
Nni
1
aj
ain (1 + r   ) (1 + r   ) ln

npr
(1  p) (n     (n  1))

:
Note that the sign of si is equal to the sign of ln

npr
(1 p)(n  (n 1))

: If this is negative, si < 0 is
not feasible. In this case, all agents choose zero investment. Alternatively, if ln

npr
(1 p)(n  (n 1))

>
0; the equilibrium is s. Finally, the condition si  AP []i (s) simplies to
1
aiP
N
1
aj
 r(1 )n(1 )(1+r )
for each i 2 N: Since a1  :::  an; this is equivalent to
1
anP
N
1
aj
 r(1 )n(1 )(1+r ) :
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Proof. (Proposition 3) By Equation 1, agent is utility under LP [] becomes
U
LP []
i (si; sj) =  pe airsi   (1  p)e

(1 )(1+(n 1))
n

aisi+
(1 )(1 )
n
ai
P
Nni sj :
The unconstrained maximizer of this expression is
i (s i) =
n ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

ai (nr + (1  ) (1 + (n  1)))  
(1  ) (1  )
(nr + (1  ) (1 + (n  1)))
0@X
Nni
sj
1A :
Thus, agent is best response is bi (s i) = max f0; i (s i)g : Now, note that nai(nr+(1 )(1+(n 1))) >
0 and (1 )(1 )(nr+(1 )(1+(n 1))) > 0: Thus, if ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

 0; agent is best response is
bi (s i) = 0. Since this is true for every agent, the unique Nash equilibrium is then (0; :::; 0) :
Alternatively assume ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

> 0: To calculate the equilibrium for this case,
rst note that the agentsbest responses are ordered as b1  :::  bn.12 As a result, the equilibrium
is of the form s1  :::  sn where agents up to some k 2 N choose positive investment and the rest
chooses zero investment. That is for some k 2 N; s1  :::  sk > 0 = sk+1::: = sn: (If k = n; all
agents choose positive investment in equilibrium.) To nd such an equilibrium, we solve the system
fi (s1; :::; sk; 0; :::; 0) = si j i = 1; :::; kg and obtain
si =
0@ 1
ai
  (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) k + n ( (1  ) + r)
kX
j=1
1
aj
1A ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

r +  (1  )
for each i 2 f1; :::; kg : Solving this system guarantees that agents 1; :::; k are playing best responses.
To guarantee that agents k + 1; :::; n are playing best responses by choosing zero investment, it is
su¢ cient to make sure that an equilibrium where agent k + 1 also chooses positive investment is
not feasible, that is,0@ 1
ak+1
  (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) (k + 1) + n ( (1  ) + r)
k+1X
j=1
1
aj
1A < 0:
This condition implies that for each i 2 fk + 1; :::; ng ; we have i
 
s i

< 0:
For the if and only if statement, rst note that Inequality 3 implies
1
an
  (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  )n+ n ( (1  ) + r)
X
N
1
aj
 0:
12More specically, the unconstrained best responses all have the same slope and are ordered with respect to their
intercepts. Thus, they are ordered as 1  2:::  n.
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Thus by the rst part of the proof, at the unique Nash equilibrium, k = n: That is, s = (s1; :::; sn) >
0: Also note that if LP []i (s)  0 for each i 2 N; we again have s = (s1; :::; sn) > 0.
Now since s = (s1; :::; sn) > 0; the condition LP []i (s)  0 can be rewritten as
1
aiP
N
1
aj
 (r + 1) (1  ) (1  )
n (1   + r) (1  + )
for each i 2 N: Since a1  :::  an; this condition is equivalent to Inequality 3, that is,
1
anP
N
1
aj

(r+1)(1 )(1 )
n(1 +r)(1 +) :
Proof. (Theorem 1) There are three possible cases. First assume that ln

npr
(1 p)(n  (n 1))

>
0 for all  2 [0; 1] : Then, under all rules we have interior equilibria where agents all choose positive
investment levels. Then, total investment under these rules is
X
N
si =
X
N
n (1 + r   ) +  (1  ) +  (1  ) ai
P
Nni
1
aj
ain (1 + r   ) (1 + r   ) ln

npr
(1  p) (n     (n  1))

=
 X
N
1
ai
!
1
r    + 1 ln

npr
(1  p) (n     (n  1))

:
Let us look at its derivative with respect to  :
@

ln

npr
(1 p)(n  (n 1))
 P
N
1
aj
r +1

@
=
(n  1)x
(r    + 1) (n   +    n) > 0:
So, as AP [] gets closer to PRO, its equilibrium total investment level increases.
Now assume that ln

npr
(1 p)(n  (n 1))

= 0 for some  2 [0; 1] : Since the ln term is increas-
ing in ; we have ln

npr
(1 p)(n  (n 1))

> 0 for all  2 (; 1]: For these rules, the previous case
shows that total investment is increasing in : On the other hand, ln

npr
(1 p)(n  (n 1))

< 0 for
all  2 [0; ) and all of these rules induce zero investment in equilibrium.
Finally, assume that ln

npr
(1 p)(n  (n 1))

< 0 for all  2 [0; 1] : Then all AP [] rules induce
zero investment in equilibrium.
Proof. (Theorem 2) There are three possible cases. First assume that ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

>
0 for all  2 [0; 1] : Then, under all rules we have interior equilibria where agents all choose positive
investment levels. Then, total investment under these rules is
X
N
si =
n2 (r +   ) ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))
P
N
1
ai
A
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where A =
0BB@
(nr + 1   + (n  1) (1  ))2
+(nr + 1   + (n  1) (1  )) (n  2) (1  ) (1  )
  (n  1) (1  )2 (1  )2
1CCA : Let us look at its deriv-
ative with respect to  :
@
 
n2(r+ ) ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))
P
N
1
ai
((nr+1 +(n 1)(1 ))2+(nr+1 +(n 1)(1 ))(n 2)(1 )(1 ) (n 1)(1 )2(1 )2)
!
@
=
  (n  1)
P
N
1
ai

(n  + 1) (r    + 1) < 0:
So, as LP [] gets closer to PRO, its equilibrium total investment level decreases.
Now assume that ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

= 0 for some  2 [0; 1] : Since the ln term is
decreasing in ; we have ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

> 0 for all  2 [0; ): For these rules, the previous
case shows that total investment is decreasing in : On the other hand, ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

< 0
for all  2 (; 1] and all of these rules induce zero investment in equilibrium.
Finally, assume that ln

npr
(1 )(1 p)(1+(n 1))

< 0 for all  2 [0; 1] : Then all LP [] rules induce
zero investment in equilibrium.
Proof. (Lemma 4) Inserting the equilibrium investment levels into the agentspayo¤ functions,
we obtain the following indirect utility functions.
In equilibrium, PRO induces the welfare level UPROi (
 
GPRO

) =8><>:  p

(1 p)(1 )
pr
 r
(r+1 )   (1  p)

pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )
(r+1 )
if ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0;
 1 otherwise.
In equilibrium, EA induces the welfare level UEAi
 
(GEA)

=8>><>>:  p

(1 p)(2 )
2pr
 r(2+2r )aj+rai
2aj(r+1)(r +1)   (1  p)

2pr
(1 p)(2 )
 2(1+r )aj r(ai+aj)
2aj(r+1)(r +1) if ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

> 0;
 1 otherwise.
In equilibrium, EL induces the welfare level UELi
 
(GEL)

=8><>:  p

(1 p)(1 )
2pr
ai(1+2r )
2(1+r )

1
ai
  (1 )
(1+2r )
1
aj

  (1  p)

2pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )(ai+aj)
2aj(1+r ) if ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0;
 1 otherwise.
Item (i) holds since UPROi (
 
GPRO

) is independent of ai. To see items (ii) and (iii) ; we simply
compare the welfare expressions for the two agents.
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By Lemma 4, PRO produces the following egalitarian social welfare function.
EGPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) = U
PRO
1 (
 
GPRO

) = UPRO2 (
 
GPRO

) =8><>:  p

(1 p)(1 )
pr
 r
(r+1 )   (1  p)

pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )
(r+1 )
if ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0;
 1 otherwise.
EA produces the following egalitarian social welfare function. We again use UEA1
 

 
GEA
 
UEA2
 

 
GEA

by Lemma 4. Thus, EGEA (p; r; ; a1; a2) = UEA1 (
 
GEA

) =8><>:  p

(1 p)(2 )
2pr
 r(2+2r )a2+ra1
2a2(r+1)(r +1)   (1  p)

2pr
(1 p)(2 )
 2(1+r )a2 r(a1+a2)
2a2(r+1)(r +1) if ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

> 0;
 1 otherwise.
Since by Lemma 4, UEL1 (
 
GEL

)  UEL2 (
 
GEL

); EL produces the egalitarian social welfare
function EGEL (p; r; ; a1; a2) = UEL2 (
 
GEL

) =8><>:  p

(1 p)(1 )
2pr
a2(1+2r )
2(1+r )

1
a2
  (1 )
(1+2r )
1
a1

  (1  p)

2pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )(a1+a2)
2a1(1+r ) if ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0;
 1 otherwise.
The following lemma shows that the egalitarian social welfare under EL is maximized when a1 = a2:
Lemma 6 For parameter values where EL induces an interior equilibrium (where all agents choose
a positive investment level), that is, when ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0; the egalitarian social welfare level
under EL is decreasing in a2: Thus, it is maximized when a1 = a2 and, is given by the expression
EGEL (p; r; ; a; a) =  p

(1  p) (1  )
2pr
 r
r +1
  (1  p)

2pr
(1  p) (1  )
 (1 )
(1+r )
:
Proof. To prove this, we let a2 = a1 + x and di¤erentiate EGEL with respect to x: Now
@(EGEL(p;r;;a1;a1+x))
@x =
( 1)
2a1(r +1)
0@ (1 p)
2pr
( 1)(p 1)
 ( 1)(x+2a1)
2a1(r +1)
+ p
2pr
( 1)(p 1)
 (x x+2ra1)
2a1+2ra1 2a1
1A ln 2pr( 1)(p 1)
is negative since
ln

2pr
( 1)(p 1)

> 0: Thus, EGEL is maximized at a2 = a1 = a: The expression then becomes
EGEL (p; r; ; a; a) =  p

(1  p) (1  )
2pr
 r
r +1
  (1  p)

2pr
(1  p) (1  )
 (1 )
(1+r )
:
A similar statement is true for EA.
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Lemma 7 For parameter values where EA induces an interior equilibrium (where all agents choose
a positive investment level), that is, when ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

> 0; the egalitarian social welfare level
under EA is decreasing in a2: Thus, it is maximized when a1 = a2 and, is given by the expression
EGEA (p; r; ; a; a) =  p

(1  p) (2  )
2pr
 r
r +1
  (1  p)

2pr
(1  p) (2  )
 1 
r +1
:
Proof. To prove this, we let a2 = a1 + x and di¤erentiate EGEA with respect to x: Now
@(EGEA(p;r;;a1;a1+x))
@x =
 ra1
2(x+a1)
2(r+1)(r +1)A

ln 2pr( 2)(p 1)

; where
A = (1  p) 2
(x+a1 x+ra1 a1+rx  12 rx ra1)
(x+a1)(r+1)(r +1)

pr
(   2) (p  1)
 (2x+2a1 2x+2ra1 2a1+2rx rx 2ra1)
2(x+a1)(r+1)(r +1)
+

1
2
 r(2x+2a1 x+2ra1+2rx)
2(x+a1)(r+1)(r +1)
p

(   2) (p  1)
pr
 r(2x+2a1 x+2ra1+2rx)
2(x+a1)(r+1)(r +1)
is negative since ln

2pr
( 2)(p 1)

> 0: Thus, EGEA is maximized at a2 = a1 = a: The expression
then becomes
EGEA (p; r; ; a; a) =  p

(1  p) (2  )
2pr
 r
r +1
  (1  p)

2pr
(1  p) (2  )
 1 
r +1
:
We next use the above lemmas to show that PRO induces higher egalitarian social welfare than
both EA and EL.
Proof. (Theorem 3) Note that a1  a2:We rst show that EGPRO (p; r; ; a) > EGEL (p; r; ; a)
is always true. Due to the assumption ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

> 0; and due to Lemma 6, we have
EGEL (p; r; ; a1; a2)  EGEL (p; r; ; a1; a1) =  p

(1 p)(1 )
2pr
 r
r +1   (1   p)

2pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )
(1+r )
and EGPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) =  p

(1 p)(1 )
pr
 r
(r+1 )   (1   p)

pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )
(r+1 )
: The inequality
EGPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) > EG
EL (p; r; ; a1; a1) simplies to 2
 r
r+1 + r(1 )2
(1 )
(r+1 )  r+1 (1 ) > 0 which
is true for all  2 (0; 1) and r 2 (0; 1]. This proves EGPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) > EGEL (p; r; ; a1; a2) :
We next show that EGPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) > EGEA (p; r; ; a1; a2) is always true. Now by as-
sumption ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

> 0 and Lemma 7, we have EGEA (p; r; ; a1; a2)  EGEA (p; r; ; a1; a1) =
 p

(1 p)(2 )
2pr
 r
r +1 (1 p)

2pr
(1 p)(2 )
 1 
r +1
and EGPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) =  p

(1 p)(1 )
pr
 r
(r+1 ) 
(1 p)

pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )
(r+1 )
: The inequality EGPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) > EGEA (p; r; ; a1; a1) simplies
to the inequality
1 
2
+r
(1 2 )
1 
r +1
  1 +r
(1 )
(1 )
(r+1 )
> 0 which is true for all  2 (0; 1) and r 2 (0; 1].
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The utilitarian social welfare function induced by PRO is UTPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) =8><>:  2p

(1 p)(1 )
pr
 r
(r+1 )   2(1  p)

pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )
(r+1 )
if ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0;
 2 otherwise.
EA produces the utilitarian social welfare UTEA (p; r; ; a1; a2) =8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
  p
2pr
(1 p)(2 )
 r(2+2r )a2+ra1
2a2(r+1)(r +1)
  (1  p)

2pr
(1 p)(2 )
 2(1+r )a2 r(a1+a2)
2a2(r+1)(r +1)
  p
2pr
(1 p)(2 )
 r(2+2r )a1+ra2
2a1(r+1)(r +1)
  (1  p)

2pr
(1 p)(2 )
 2(1+r )a1 r(a1+a2)
2a1(r+1)(r +1)
if ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

> 0;
 2 otherwise.
Finally, EL produces the utilitarian social welfare UTEL (p; r; ; a1; a2) =8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
 p

(1 p)(1 )
2pr
a1(1+2r )
2(1+r )

1
a1
  (1 )
(1+2r )
1
a2

  (1  p)

2pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )(a1+a2)
2a2(1+r )
 p

(1 p)(1 )
2pr
a2(1+2r )
2(1+r )

1
a2
  (1 )
(1+2r )
1
a1

  (1  p)

2pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )(a1+a2)
2a1(1+r )
if ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

 0;
 2 otherwise.
The following lemma shows that the utilitarian social welfare under EL is maximized when
a1 = a2:
Lemma 8 For parameter values where EL induces an interior equilibrium (where all agents choose
a positive investment level), that is, when ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

 0, the utilitarian social welfare level
under EL is decreasing in a2: Thus, it is maximized when a2 = a1 and, is given by the expression
UTEL (p; r; ; a; a) =  2p

(1  ) (1  p)
2pr
 r
r +1
  2 (1  p)

2pr
(   1) (p  1)
 1 
r +1
:
Proof. To prove this, we let a2 = a1+x and di¤erentiate UTEL with respect to x:
@(UTEL(p;r;;a;a+x))
@x =
28
 (1 )
2a1(x+a1)
2(r +1)

ln 2pr(1 )(1 p)

A where
A =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 
x2 + a21

(1  p)

2pr
( 1)(p 1)
 (1 )(x+2a1)
2a1(r +1)
 a21 (1  p)

2pr
( 1)(p 1)
 (1 )(x+2a1)
2(x+a1)(r +1)
+2
( 12x+2a1  12x+ra1 2a1)
a1(r +1) xa1 (1  p)

pr
( 1)(p 1)
 (1 )(x+2a1)
2a1(r +1)
 pa21

2pr
( 1)(p 1)
 x(1+2r )+2ra1
2(x+a1)(r +1)
+p (x+ a1)
2

2pr
( 1)(p 1)
x(1 ) 2ra1
2a1(r +1)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
Note that this derivative is negative if x  0 and ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0. Thus, UTEL is maxi-
mized when a2 = a1 (or equivalently, when x = 0). Then, UTEL becomes UTEL (p; r; ; a; a) =
 2p

(1 )(1 p)
2pr
 r
r +1   2 (1  p)

2pr
( 1)(p 1)
 1 
r +1
:
We next use the above lemma to show that PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than
EL.
Proof. (Theorem 4) Note that a1  a2:We rst show that UTPRO (p; r; ; a) > UTEL (p; r; ; a)
is always true. Due to the assumption ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

> 0; and due to Lemma 8, we have
UTEL (p; r; ; a1; a2)  UTEL (p; r; ; a1; a1) =  2p

(1 )(1 p)
2pr
 r
r +1 2 (1  p)

2pr
( 1)(p 1)
 1 
r +1
:
We will compare this expression to the utilitarian social welfare under PRO: UTPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) =
 2p

(1 p)(1 )
pr
 r
(r+1 )   2(1   p)

pr
(1 p)(1 )
 (1 )
(r+1 )
: The inequality UTPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) >
UTEL (p; r; ; a1; a1) simplies to 2
1 
r +1 + (1 )r 2
 r
r +1   (1 +r)r > 0 which is true for all  2 (0; 1)
and r 2 (0; 1]. Therefore UTPRO > UTEL.
8 Appendix B: Constrained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal
Losses Rules
In this section, we discuss the investment games induced by the Constrained Equal Awards (CEA)
and the Constrained Equal Losses (CEL) rules, particularly in relation to their unconstrained
counterparts, the EA and EL rules.
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8.0.1 Constrained Equal Awards
For  = 0; AP [] becomes the Equal Awards rule, EA: This is the unconstrained version of a well-
known rule from the axiomatic literature, called the Constrained Equal Awards rule, CEA; dened
in Section 2: The function CEAi is written below more explicitly for the case of two agents: if agent
i invests too little (the rst line), he gets full refund and if he invests too much (the third line),
the other agent gets full refund. For in-between investment levels (the second line), the liquidation
value of the rm is equally allocated between the two agents, similar to EA.
CEAi (si; sj) =
8>><>>:
si if si  2  sj ;

2 (si + sj) if

2  sj  si  2  sj ;
(si + sj)  sj if si  2  sj :
By Equation 1, the utility function of agent i is
UCEAi (si; sj) =
8>><>>:
 pe airsi   (1  p) if si  2  sj ;
 pe airsi   (1  p)e ai 2 (si+sj)+aisi if 2  sj  si  2  sj ;
 pe airsi   (1  p)eai(1 )(si+sj) if si  2  sj :
Note that, agent is payo¤ function is di¤erent in each one of the three intervals.13 To determine
his best response to s i; agent i compares his payo¤s from each one of his optimal choices in these
intervals and picks the one(s) that yield the highest payo¤. This leads to discontinuities in the
agentsbest responses. Thus, a Nash equilibrium does not exist for every parameter combination.14
However, if it exists, it is identical to the unique equilibrium under EA:
Proposition 9 There is no Nash equilibrium s where for some i 2 N; CEAi(s) = si <
1
n
P
N s

j : Therefore, there is a unique Nash equilibrium under CEA. Also, if s
 is a Nash equilib-
rium under CEA, then s is also a Nash equilibrium under EA.
Proof. Let s 2 S be such that for some i 2 N; si < n
P
N sj . Di¤erentiating, agent is payo¤
function for this case, we obtain
@UCEAi (si; s i)
@si
=
@ ( pe airsi   (1  p))
@si
= aipre
 airsi > 0:
13The number of cases in agent is utility function increases with the number of agents. For n agents, the precise
number of cases is 1 +
Pn 1
k=1
 
n
k

:
14For example, let N = f1; 2g ; p = 0:8;  = 0:6, r = 0:5, a1 = 0:4; and a2 = 4:
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Therefore, no such si is a best response for agent i. The higher is si; the higher is his payo¤. Thus
there is no Nash equilibrium s where for some i 2 N , si < n
P
N s

j :
Now let s be a Nash equilibrium under CEA. Then, s is such that for each i 2 N; CEAi (s) =

n
P
N s

j . Thus,
UCEAi (s

i ; s

 i) = U
EA
i (s

i ; s

 i) =  pe airs

i   (1  p)e ai( n(
P
Nni s

j) (1  n )si ):
Therefore, if i 2 N is playing a best response with respect to UCEAi ; he is also playing a best response
with respect to UEAi : Thus, the unique equilibrium under CEA is also the unique equilibrium under
EA.
Proposition 9 implies that analyzing the Nash equilibrium under EA also tells us about CEA.
8.0.2 Constrained Equal Losses
For  = 0; LP [] becomes the Equal Losses rule, EL: This is the unconstrained version of a well-
known rule from the axiomatic literature, called the Constrained Equal Losses rule, CEL: The
function CELi is written below more explicitly for the case of two-agents: if agent i invests too
little (rst line), he gets zero refund and if he invests too much (third line), the other agent gets
zero refund. For in-between investment levels (the second line), the liquidation value of the rm is
allocated to equate the agentslosses, similar to EL:15
CELi (si; sj) =
8>><>>:
0 if si  1 1+ sj ;
si   1 2 (si + sj) if 1 1+ sj  si  1+1  sj ;
(si + sj) if si  1+1  sj :
By Equation 1, the utility function of agent i becomes
UCELi (si; sj) =
8>><>>:
 pe airsi   (1  p)eaisi if si  1 1+ sj
 pe airsi   (1  p)eai 1 2 (si+sj) if 1 1+ sj  si  1+1  sj
 pe airsi   (1  p)eai(1 )si aisj if si  1+1  sj
Similar to CEA; the best response correspondences are discontinuous and a Nash equilibrium does
not exist for all parameter combinations.16
If it exists, however, for two agents, it can be one of the four following types. Note that, Type
1 and Type 2 equilibria under CEL are equal to the two types of equilibria obtained under EL.
15The number of cases in agent is utility function increases with the number of agents. As in CEA; for n agents,
the precise number of cases is 1 +
Pn 1
k=1
 
n
k

:
16For example, let N = f1; 2g ; p = 0:8;  = 0:8, r = 0:2, a1 = 1:2; and a2 = 1:8:
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Proposition 10 Let n = 2: If s is a Nash equilibrium of the investment game under CEL, then
it has either one of the following forms.
Type 1. si =
(2r +1)
2r(r +1)

1
ai
  (1 )(1 +2r) 1aj

ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

for both i 2 N or
Type 2. si = 0 for both i 2 N or
Type 3. si =
1
ai(1+r)
ln

pr
1 p

and sj =
1
aj(r +1) ln

pr
(1 )(1 p)

+ ai(r+1)(r +1) ln

pr
1 p

or
Type 4. si = 0 and s

j =
1
aj(1+r ) ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

:
Proof. Note that UCELi (si; sj) has three parts. For the two agents, there are two possible cases.
Case 1. In equilibrium both agents fall into the second part of their payo¤ function, which is
identical to the one under EL. Then the equilibrium characterization is also identical to EL: The
equilibrium is either of Type 1 or Type 2.
Case 2. In equilibrium, agent i falls into the rst part of his payo¤ function and agent j falls into
the third part. If the local maximizer of the rst part of agent is payo¤ function is zero, then the
equilibrium is of Type 4. Otherwise, it is of Type 3.
Proposition 10 implies that analyzing the Nash equilibrium under EL also tells us about the
rst two types of equilibria under CEL.
Remark 1 In a Type 4 equilibrium under CEL; only one agent invests and his choice is identical to
what he would choose under PRO: For the same parameters, both agents choose positive investment
under PRO: Thus, a Type 4 equilibrium under CEL induces less total investment than PRO.
9 Appendix C: Numerical Welfare Comparisons
When comparing the social welfare levels induced by two bankruptcy rules, we will sometimes
observe that the welfare ordering between them depends on the parameter values under con-
sideration. In such cases, to compare the rules we will run a numerical analysis. We will use
the following parameter values: p 2 f0:01; 0:06; 0:11; :::; 0:96g ;  2 f0:01; 0:06; 0:11; :::; 0:96g ;
r 2 f0:01; 0:06; 0:11; :::; 0:96g ; a1 2 f0:1; 1:1; 2:1; :::; 50:1g ; and a2 2 fa1; a1 + 1:::; 50:1g : This cor-
responds to 10608000 parameter combinations. For each parameter combination, we will calculate
the equilibrium welfare levels induced by each bankruptcy rule and then compare these levels.
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9.1 Egalitarian Social Welfare
Note that ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

> ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

> ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

: If ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

 0; all three
rules lead to a boundary equilibrium (with zero investment) and trivially, to the same welfare level
EGEL (p; r; ; a1; a2) = EG
EA (p; r; ; a1; a2) = EG
PRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) =  1:
Otherwise, we have the following cases.
Case 1: All three rules induce positive investment in equilibrium.
This case happens when ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

> 0: For this case, Theorem 3 shows that PRO induces
higher Egalitarian social welfare than both EA and EL: The ordering between EA and EL depends
on the parameter values. We thus carry out the following numerical comparison.
Numerical comparison of EA with EL: This case corresponds to 1294986 parameter combina-
tions. Among them, EA induce a higher social welfare 949377 times (73 percent) and EL induce a
higher social welfare 345609 times (27 percent). The two rules never induce the same welfare level.
Case 2: EA leads to zero investment in equilibrium.
This case happens when ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0  ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

: Then, both PRO and EL lead
to interior equilibria (with positive investment) and EA leads to a boundary equilibrium (with
zero investment). Thus, EGEA (p; r; ; a1; a2) =  1: We already showed in Theorem 3 that PRO
induces higher social welfare than EL when both induce positive investment in equilibrium. To
compare PRO and EA, note that under PRO, each agent chooses a positive investment level as a
dominant strategy, even though choosing zero investment and receiving the payo¤  1 is feasible.
Thus EGPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) >  1 = EGEA (p; r; ; a1; a2) :
To sum up, PRO induces a higher social welfare than both EL and EA in this case too.
Numerical comparison of EA with EL: This case corresponds to 829058 parameter combi-
nations. Among them, EA induce a higher social welfare 9437 times (1 percent) and EL induce a
higher social welfare 819621 times (99 percent). The two rules never induce the same welfare level.
Case 3: Both EA and PRO lead to zero investment in equilibrium.
This case happens when ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0  ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

: Then EA and PRO lead to
boundary equilibria (with zero investment) and EGEA (p; r; ; a1; a2) = EGPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) =
 1: We numerically compare this payo¤ to EGEL (p; r; ; a1; a2).
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Numerical comparison of EL with PRO and EA: This case corresponds to 481118 parameter
combinations. In all of them, EL induces a higher social welfare than EA and PRO.
9.2 Utilitarian Social Welfare
Note that ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

> ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

> ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

: If ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

 0; all three
rules lead to a boundary equilibrium (with zero investment) and trivially, to the same welfare level
UTEL (p; r; ; a1; a2) = UT
EA (p; r; ; a1; a2) = UT
PRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) =  2:
Otherwise, we have the following cases.
Case 1: All three rules induce positive investment in equilibrium.
This case happens when ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

> 0. We showed in Theorem 4 that, in this case, PRO
always induces a higher utilitarian social welfare than EL. The relationship between PRO and EA
and between EA and EL changes with the parameters.
Numerical comparison of EA with EL: This case corresponds to 1294986 parameter combi-
nations. Among them, EA induce a higher social welfare 851736 times (66 percent) and EL induce
a higher social welfare 443250 times (34 percent). The two rules never induce the same welfare
level.
Numerical comparison of EA with PRO: This case corresponds to 2726424 parameter com-
binations. Among them, PRO induce a higher social welfare 1659219 times (61 percent) and EA
induce a higher social welfare 1067205 times (39 percent). The two rules never induce the same
welfare level.
Case 2: EA leads to zero investment in equilibrium.
This case happens when ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0  ln

pr
(1 p)(1 
2
)

: Then, both PRO and EL lead
to interior equilibria and EA leads to a boundary equilibrium. Thus, EGEA (p; r; ; a1; a2) =  2:
We already showed in Theorem 4 that PRO induces higher social welfare than EL in this case. To
compare PRO and EA, note that under PRO, each agent chooses a positive investment level as a
dominant strategy, even though choosing zero investment and receiving the payo¤  1 is feasible.
Thus UTPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) >  2 = UTEA (p; r; ; a1; a2) :
To sum up, PRO induces a higher social welfare than both EL and EA in this case.
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Numerical comparison of EA with EL: This case corresponds to 829058 parameter combina-
tions. Among them, EA induce a higher social welfare 544892 times (66 percent) and EL induce a
higher social welfare 284166 times (34 percent). The two rules never induce the same welfare level.
Case 3: Both EA and PRO lead to zero investment in equilibrium.
This case happens when ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0  ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

: Then EA and PRO lead to
boundary equilibria (where agents choose zero investment) and UTEA (p; r; ; a) = UTPRO (p; r; ; a) =
 2:
In terms of the probability of success, this case corresponds to the interval p 2 ( 1 2r+1  ; 1 r+1  ]:
If p = 1 2r+1  ; ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

= 0 and under all three rules, Nash equilibrium investment is
zero. Therefore, UTEL

1 
2r+1  ; r; ; a1; a1

=  2: If p > 1 r+1  ; PRO induces positive invest-
ment in equilibrium. For in between p values we have
@(UTEL(p;r;;a1;a2))
@p < 0 if and only if
p 2 ( 1 2r+1  ; 1 r+1  ) and
@(UTEL(p;r;;a1;a2))
@p = 0 if and only if p =
1 
r+1  : Therefore, for each
p 2 ( 1 2r+1  ; 1 r+1  ]; UTEL (p; r; ; a1; a1) < UTEL

1 
2r+1  ; r; ; a1; a1

=  2: Since by Lemma 8,
UTEL (p; r; ; a1; a1)  UTEL (p; r; ; a1; a2) ; we have UTEL (p; r; ; a1; a2) <  2: This is summa-
rized in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 Assume ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

> 0  ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

: Then
UTEL (p; r; ; a1; a2) <  2 = UTEA (p; r; ; a1; a2) = UTPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) :
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